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Abstract—Experts often design security and privacy tech-
nology with specific use cases and threat models in mind.
In practice however, end users are not aware of these
threats and potential countermeasures. Furthermore, mis-
conceptions about the benefits and limitations of security
and privacy technology inhibit large-scale adoption by end
users. In this paper, we address this challenge and contribute
a qualitative study on end users’ and security experts’ per-
ceptions of threat models and potential countermeasures. We
follow an inductive research approach to explore perceptions
and mental models of both security experts and end users.
We conducted semi-structured interviews with 8 security ex-
perts and 13 end users. Our results suggest that in contrast to
security experts, end users neglect acquaintances and friends
as attackers in their threat models. Our findings highlight
that experts value technical countermeasures whereas end
users try to implement trust-based defensive methods.
Index Terms—Usable Security and Privacy, Mental Models,
Threat Models
1. Introduction
Human error is considered among the main causes of
many security problems. All types of users ranging from
end users to knowledgeable experts such as administrators,
developers, and designers are confronted with security
decisions that they are incapable of making in an informed
way. In fact however, every human in the chain who is
considered an expert contributes to making the Internet
ecosystem secure and user friendly. Their decisions when
designing, developing, or configuring systems heavily
impact how users perceive and understand the system.
Such functional mental models are important for users to
make technically sound security decisions. Each of these
humans has a different perspective. While theorists who
design cryptographic protocols aim for correctness, users
at the more practical end of the spectrum value - in the
broader sense of the meaning - a usable application.
Out of these diverse objectives and various backgrounds,
different understandings and perceptions of security and
threats emerge. On the one hand, users often do not
understand the theoretical fundamentals behind systems,
i.e., how and why they work and in particular, how IT-
applications can be secured. On the other hand, back end-
developers do not primarily consider how applications
they develop are perceived and used by end users.
In this work, we explore how users and experts perceive
security concepts and which threat models they have.
We furthermore qualitatively describe the gap between
experts’ and lay users’ perceptions.
In particular, we explore which threat models experts and
end users consider relevant and how they perceive the
potential damage associated with these threats. We also
identify actors or beneficiaries of the threats and partici-
pants’ reasoning behind potential intentions of attackers.
We also study which methods both groups of participants
consider as prevention techniques against these attacks.
Related work examined mental models of users regarding
specific security technologies and topics, e.g., Krombholz
et al. for HTTPS [7] and Wu et al. for encryption [13]-
or focused on age groups - see Frik et al. for elderly
people [2].
While all of these studies focused on specific technology
or application areas, no other study considered general
threats that users face in the Internet ecosystem. Our
research follows an inductive approach; we conducted a
formative interview study with 8 security experts and 13
end users and identify dimensions of perceived threats for
each group of users. Although our study has a relatively
small sample size, it provides insights to understand the
gap between the end users’ and the experts’ understanding
of relevant threat models. We are confident that the results
of this formative interview study lay important founda-
tions for future work with respect to specific technology
and use cases.
2. Related Work
Mental models play a fundamental role in human
decision making. How we understand the world influences
how we behave and react. In this chapter, we examine
related work that focuses on mental models w.r.t. security
and privacy perception or the usability of deploying
security or privacy increasing systems.
It is hard to change mental models in order to force or
favor a specific behaviour. Wash et al. [11] presented
ideas to influence mental models towards more secure
behaviour even for non-tech-savvy end users.
The necessity to not only include end users but also
experts is supported by findings of Krombholz et al. [8]:
Even administrators struggle to deploy HTTPS securely
and need to rely on online sources.
Also, Krombholz et al. [7] studied the mental models
of both end users and administrators of HTTPS and
conducted a study with 30 participants. Among others,
they found severe misconceptions regarding it-security
concepts such as authentication and encryption and
discuss design implications for interfaces and protocols.
Kang et al. [6] studied how laypeople and people with
computer science background understand the internet and
its effects on privacy and security decisions. The authors
conclude that privacy and security decisions should not
primarily rely on users’ practices.
Additionally, Gallagher et al. [3] present a mental model
study that exposes faulty mental models of experts
and users w.r.t. Tor, which could lead to wrongful
use with unwanted consequences of the tool. Wu et
al. [13] explored users’ mental models of encryption.
They present a qualitative study with 19 semi-structured
interviews that only focuses on this specific issue and
come up with four mental models of encryption. The
research of Zeng et al. [14] shows that mental models
of end users often do not match with reality. They
explore the mental models users have of threats regarding
smart-home devices. Redmiles et al. [9] explored the
decision making behind security-relevant decisions of
end users with a qualitative study.
With a growing number of users of smart home devices,
the number of people affected by privacy and security
problems coming with this relatively new technology is
growing, too. In their work, Tabassum et al. [10] showed
that users tend to transfer threat models they have from
other computing areas to the field of smart home. The
authors give several recommendations for developers of
smart home systems, such as providing more transparency
and control and educating users about potential risks.
Wash et al. [12] surveyed United States Internet users in
order to check causal beliefs regarding computer security
and security promoting practices of the participants.
3. Methodology
As a first step to address user perceptions of security
terminology and threat models from a holistic perspective,
we chose an inductive research approach.
Our results should be interpreted as a formative interview
study with different types of users. We designed a semi-
structured interview guideline; the full Interview guideline
can be found in Appendix A. We recorded and transcribed
all interviews and then two researchers performed inde-
pendent open coding. We conducted interviews until no
new themes emerged, until saturation was reached [4].
We conducted one interview via Skype, and the remainder
of the interviews face-to-face. The same semi-structured
interview guideline was used for end users and experts.
Among all participants, we raffled a 50 Amazon voucher.
Our university’s ethical review board (ERB) approved our
study.
3.1. Briefing
Before the audio recording started, we informed the
participants about the interview topic and procedure. We
emphasized that there are no right or wrong answers to our
questions and that the aim of the study was to capture the
genuine perceptions of the participants and not to examine
technical understanding of IT-Security topics. We briefly
explained the analysis of the interviews which includes the
anonymous transcription of the recording. We informed
them of their right to discontinue the interview at any
point in time without giving a reason and that they can
contact us at any point after the interview and request
the deletion of their data. The participants were given a
written informed consent form to sign that includes all of
the previous information (see Appendix C).
3.2. Interview Guideline
The interview guideline was structured according to
the following topics:
1) Internet usage and devices
2) Threats towards the participants and their devices.
3) Threats towards the interaction with a 3rd party
e.g. the provider of an online shopping service.
4) Threats towards the 3rd party.
IT-security as a topic for an interview can be intimi-
dating for end users. This is why we started with basic,
non-technical questions about Internet and device usage.
In order to collect genuine threat models (threats that are
vital and obvious for the participant), we try not to restrict
or influence the participants with our questions. This is
why we ask briefly and openly to “think of threats towards
the end user and their devices”.
Based on the answers, it is necessary to clarify or to
go deeper and query additional information about the
mentioned threats and dimensions that are important parts
of the threat landscape. Our intention is to capture di-
mensions and themes about potential attackers and their
intentions, maximum damage than can be caused, how
the attack is executed and finally what can be done by end
users in order to prevent or defend against such a threat.
We continued by depicting a brief example scenario to
introduce 3rd party IT-infrastructure. As a reference point,
we mentioned a provider of a service that most likely
everyone has used at some point: an online shop. Par-
ticipants should think of threats that target the process
of ordering an item in this shop. Additionally to the
important information mentioned above, the participant
should now both think of defensive actions carried out
by themselves as customers and also by the provider.
Finally, the participant should think of threats directly
targeting the providers and their infrastructure. Here, also
both parties should be taken into account when thinking
of defense methods.
3.3. Pilot Study
We conducted a pilot interview with one end user and
found that the questions were too technical. The partic-
ipant requested clarification for these questions several
times. We dropped explanations of technical terms and
added the online shop scenario to make the situation
more tangible. Additionally, we collected feedback from
a psychologist on the study design and the structure of
the interview guideline.
3.4. Recruitment
We recruited thirteen end users; the main sampling
criteria was to not have a background in computer science.
End users were recruited via snowball sampling, word-of-
mouth recommendations of acquaintances, and postings
on the bulletin boards at the university campus. Partici-
pants could contact the interview coordinator via phone
or email. The interview was announced as “Interview
about IT Security”. A familiarity distance of at least 1
to both of the interviewers was maintained which means
that interviewers did not interview direct acquaintances.
To counter social desirability bias and avoid intimidating
influences, we did not conduct interviews with end users at
our research institute but in a place of their choice where
they felt comfortable. At the request of the participants,
interviews were also conducted at their apartment, a neu-
tral room at our university or their workplace.
For our sampling method, we define experts as persons
that fulfill at least one of the following criteria:
1) an expert is a person that has at least 3 years
of work experience as a security developer or
security consultant, or
2) a person who studied computer science or cyber-
security and has work or research experience in
the field.
We recruited experts via word of mouth and emails and
interviewed eight experts, six of them were researchers
from different research areas and different fields of work.
All experts were male and aged between 23 and 39. We
conducted the expert interviews either in our lab or via
Skype.
Participants were asked to give their consent to the audio
recording and the anonymous transcription and analysis
of the interview.
3.5. Participants and Demographics
In total, our analysis is based on 21 interviews with
experts (N=8) and end users (N=13). All interviews were
conducted in German. The participants were German,
Italian, Swiss, and Portuguese nationals and aged between
17 and 53 years, all spoke German at a native level. The
interviews lasted between 11 and 34 minutes.
In the end user sample, we had seven female participants
and six male (54% female). End users’ age ranged from 17
to 53 (avg=27,2 years). Seven of them were working full-
time, six were students (two at schools, four at different
universities).
Experts were skewed to the younger side (avg=27,3) and
age ranged from 23 to 39. Our expert sample included
four security-focused grad students, three Ph.D. students
concerned with IT-security, and one senior researcher. All
experts had working and/or research experience in IT-
security. Expert research and work fields ranged from
web security over automotive security to mobile security,
protocol verification, security consulting and penetration
testing. Except for the group criteria, age, gender, citizen-
ship and occupation, we did not query any demographic
data and did not actively seek certain statuses of these
characteristics. We refer to end users as U1,. . . ,U13 and
to experts as E1,. . . ,E8.
Interview 1 Interview 2 Interview 3 Interview 4 Interview 5 Interview 6
Experts 0,81 0,82 0,89 0,86 0,9 0,93
End Users 0,74 0,92 0,7 0,9 0,86 0,8
TABLE 1. KRIPPENDORFF’S ALPHA FOR THE FIRST TWELVE
INTERVIEWS AS A MEASUREMENT FOR INTER-RATER RELIABILITY
3.6. Evaluation and Coding
We sectioned the transcriptions into logical blocks
which ideally consist of snippets of conversation that
deal with distinct concepts. By the nature of an open
conversation, concepts are distributed over several sections
and one section includes several concepts. Two researchers
iteratively coded primary codes for twelve interviews,
six interviews of each group. After examining the first,
randomly chosen interview, one researcher proposed the
first draft of a codebook that was discussed and modified.
After each interview, the two coders resolved conflicts and
modified the preliminary codebook. The final version of
the codebook can be found in Appendix B. The two coders
achieved a Krippendorff’s Alpha of 0.85 (0.88 for the
expert interviews and 0.82 for the end user interviews, see
Table1). After the first twelve interviews were coded, one
of the two coders coded the remainder of the interviews
with the established codebook. After finding the main
themes for each interview, for both of the groups, we took
a look at the set of interviews and merged the information
to come up with a group-specific overview for each threat
that includes the possible damage, the attackers and their
objectives and methods to prevent or defend against the
attack. This technique is known as axial coding. After this
step, we are able to expose prominent concepts for each
group and can qualitatively compare the groups.
4. Results
In this section, we provide an overview of all threats
that the participants mentioned as well as an overview of
the attackers that were identified and in addition counter-
measures and preventive methods.
For every threat we include damage that is done by the
respective threat, attack vectors, identified attackers and
recommended countermeasures. We highlight all codes
with italic font.
We provide figures to depict the information given by
experts with dashed lines and the information given by
end users with dotted lines. Table 2 shows how often each
threat was mentioned by both the end user and the expert
group.
4.1. Threats
4.1.1. Malware. The concept of malware [fig. 1] is preva-
lent in both groups - mentioned by nine end users and
six experts. Participants brought up various ways of be-
ing infected by malware. These include malware being
downloaded and executed unknowingly, and malware as
a byproduct of software. End users mentioned access to
the device and the following data loss, not being able
to use the device and being included in a botnet as
characterisations of malware.
Experts added code-execution, being compromised (e.g.
via keylogger), reduced performance up to not being able
Threats
Threat End Users Experts
Malware 9 (69%) 6 (75%)
Physical Theft 3 (23%) 3 (38%)
Phishing 6 (46%) 6 (75%)
Ransomware 0 (0%) 4 (50%)
XSS/Webattacks 2 (15%) 6 (75%)
Shoulder Surfing 0 (0%) 3 (38%)
Imitation 3 (23%) 5 (63%)
Data Loss 13 (100%) 8 (100%)
Denial of Service 3 (23%) 4 (50%)
Identity Theft 4 (31%) 4 (50%)
Stalking 2 (15%) 0 (0%)
TABLE 2. NUMBER OF THREATS MENTIONED BY END USERS AND
EXPERTS
Malware
Damage:
- code-execution
- being compromised
- performance
- botnet
- not able to use device
- data loss
Attacker
- state actor
- criminals
- companies
Countermeasures
- no unknown Links
- Linux
- fewer 3rd party Software 
- antivirus program
- backups
Vector:
- compromised provider
- email-appendices
- advertisement
- exploits in own software
- downloaded & executed
- byproduct of software 
Figure 1. Malware (dashed lines for expert responses, dotted lines for
end user responses)
to use the device and being included in a botnet.
Attackers were identified as state actors, criminals or
companies by both groups. Backups and use of an an-
tivirus program were the most prominent countermeasures
mentioned. Using Linux, following no unknown links and
using fewer 3rd party software was only recommended by
experts.
Physical Theft
Damage:
- arbitrary damage
- loss of device
- financial
- saved passwords
- photographs
Vector:
- theft in public area
- cracking device after theft
Attacker:
- undefined
Countermeasures:
- disk-encryption
- keep device in sight
- use PIN
Figure 2. Physical Theft
4.1.2. Physical Theft. Consequences of physical theft
[fig. 2] of a personal device were identified as the loss
of device for both groups. Financial loss that comes with
it, losing saved passwords and personal photographs was
added by end users.
The device can be lost by theft in public places and, for
end users, cracking the device after theft. Both groups did
not specify the attacker. Disk-encryption to ensure data
integrity after theft was mentioned by experts, keep device
in sight by both groups and using a PIN for data integrity
was added by end users.
Data loss
Damage:
- legal consequences
- sexual preferences
- health information
- social environment
- contact information
- advertisement
- GPS data
- login data
- personal data
- banking information
- image damage
- burglary
- documents
- search history
- company data
Vector:
- exploits in software
- phishing
- leaked actively by user
- social media provider
- eavesdrop communication
- access to servers
- purchasing / selling data
Attacker
- intimate partner
- state actor
- companies
- unknown individuals
Countermeasures
- privacy-preserving-proxy
- encrypt devices
- 2-Factor-Authentication
- TOR
- VPN
- updates
- encrypted communication
- read terms and conditions
- stop using suspicious apps
- only visit trusted websites
Figure 3. Data Loss
4.1.3. Data Loss. Attackers collecting all kinds of data
is an omnipresent theme. All participants identified invol-
untary or unwanted data loss [fig. 3] as a threat. Various
attackers, intentions, and procedures to get personal data
were mentioned and categorized as data loss. Both groups
mentioned data being lost to an adversary, e.g., contact
information, GPS data, login data, banking information
and image damage for companies. Personalized adver-
tisement was mentioned as a consequence. Only experts
mentioned legal consequences for companies that do not
meet security standards. Also, experts brought up the loss
of health information, sexual preferences and the exposure
of ones social environment as dimensions of data loss.
End users added being susceptible to burglary - if data
about expensive online purchases and addresses are lost
-, loss of documents, search history and company data.
Attackers could act out of financial reasons, because of
general surveillance for a state actor and out of curiosity
and were identified as state actor, unknown individuals,
companies and - only by one expert - intimate partners.
As countermeasures experts suggested using privacy-
preserving-proxies, encrypt devices, deploying 2-Factor-
Authentication, using Tor and VPNs and keeping systems
updated. Both groups mentioned encrypted communica-
tion. End users added that it might help to read the terms
and conditions, to stop using suspicious apps and to only
visit trusted websites.
4.1.4. Identity Theft. Participant state that attackers re-
quire a comprehensive profile and login data for identity
theft [fig. 4]. Identity theft was mentioned explicitly by
several participants which is why we decided to treat this
as an own relevant threat and as a possible consequence
Identity Theft
Vector:
- banking information
- login data
- comprehensive profile
- being hacked
Attacker
- inter/national hacker
Countermeasures
- identity check
- not saving passwords
Damage:
- misuse of name
- financial
Figure 4. Identity Theft
of data loss. As previously stated, vast personal data
and logins are crucial requirements mentioned by the
participants. With sufficient personal data it is possible
to build a personal profile that enables attackers to pose
as the victim. The misuse of name then leads to financial
damage.
Denial of Service
Damage:
- denial of water supply
- financial
- service not usable
Vector:
- using state infrastructure
- undefined
Attacker:
- state actor
- companies
- gamers
Countermeasures:
- “almost impossible”
Figure 5. Denial of Service
4.1.5. Denial of Service. Denial of Service [fig. 5] was
brought up by both groups. The targeted service being not
usable anymore is the inherent consequence. End users
did not specify how such an attack could be implemented
and experts mentioned state infrastructure as a means. E4
mentioned the possibility of state-driven denial of water
supply towards foreign states by denial of service attacks.
Companies and state actors were identified as attackers
by the experts. End users mentioned gamers as attackers.
Experts thought that state-driven denial of service attacks
as almost impossible to counter.
4.1.6. XSS/Web Attacks. From both groups it emerged
that XSS and Web Attacks [fig. 6] are a potential reason
for customer data being lost. Only experts brought up
loss of personal data, account information and being
compromised. End users added image damage and finan-
cial damage for companies. Attack vectors mentioned by
experts are using XSS exploits and scripts in browsers,
0-day exploits, flaws in protocols and faulty encryption.
Both groups mentioned 3rd party software as a measure
to attack. Companies and criminals were identified as
attackers by both groups. While end users did not come up
with countermeasures, experts suggested updates, a proper
XSS/Web Attacks
Damage:
- being compromised
- personal data
- account information
- customer data
- image damage
- financial
Vector:
- XSS exploits
- scripts in browser
- 0-day exploits
- flaws in protocol 
- faulty encryption
- flaws in 3rd party software
Attacker
- companies
- criminals
Countermeasures
- updates
- it-security department
- report to provider
- block scripts
Figure 6. XSS and Web Attacks
it-security department for companies, reporting suspicions
to the provider and blocking scripts in the browser.
Ransomware
Damage:
- financial
- data loss
- not able to use device
Attacker
- state actor
- criminals
Countermeasures
- Backups
- not paying ransom 
Vector:
- targeted attacks against 
individuals
- broad attacks against 
masses
- physical access
Figure 7. Ransomware
4.1.7. Ransomware. Ransomware [fig. 7] was only
mentioned by experts. We categorize ransomware
separately and not as malware because the characteristics
are clearly qualifying for a individual treatment. Damage
caused by by ransomware are data loss in cases where
data cannot be decrypted, financial in case the ransom
is paid or the device cannot be used anymore. Experts
mentioned targeted attacks against individuals and broad
attacks against unspecified masses as possibilities to
distribute ransomware. Also, physical access by an
attacker was added to the attack vectors. Participants
identified state actors and criminals as possible attackers
and suggested not paying the demanded ransom. One
should rather keep consistent backups in order to set up
the system again.
4.1.8. Phishing. Phishing [fig. 8] was one of the most
prominent threats identified by both groups. Six partici-
pants recognized phishing as a threat, referring to broad
attacks with lists of emails or personalized, more targeted
attacks composed by using stolen data (spear-phishing).
End users and experts mentioned financial loss, loss of
personal data, banking information and login data as
Phishing
Damage:
- financial
- personal data
- banking information
- login data
Vector:
- personalized emails
- forged invoices
- stolen data
- purchased data
- lottery promises
Attacker
- state actor
- it-savvy individuals
- companies
Countermeasures
- provider: data integrity
- 2-Factor-Authentication
- mails in textform
- check links
- check source
- ignore/delete suspicious mails
Figure 8. Phishing
damage done by phishing. Attackers would leverage stolen
data to personalize deceiving emails and forge invoices.
U5 mentioned using bought data to implement phishing
attacks. U2 added using lottery promises as a method to
deceive targets. Attackers can be state actors, companies
and it-savvy individuals. In order to counter these attacks,
participants express a general scepticism towards emails
that query critical data. If an email comes with an invoice
or payment request, participants stated that it is important
to check if they actually purchased any item that would
require such an invoice via email. Also, according to
some participants, suspicious mails should be ignored
and/or deleted right away. Others recommend checking
the source and links provided before following them. In
case login information is lost, experts propose 2-Factor-
Authentication such that the possible damage is limited.
Imitation
Damage:
- login data
- health issues
- psychological
- financial
- personal data
Vector:
- local simulation
- fake shop
- via phishing
- via saved data 
on smartphone
Attacker:
- undefined
Countermeasures:
- check shop analogous
- 2-Factor-Authentication
- use known links
Figure 9. Imitation
4.1.9. Imitation. Imitation [fig. 9], the simulation of a
service in the internet, was a threat mentioned by both
groups. Since is it not necessary to use phishing mails to
guide the victim to a fake website, we treated Imitation as
an own threat. Imitations could be a copy of an existing
shop or a fake shop in itself and try to catch login data
and money from victims. Experts mentioned health issues
as a consequence since a Patient could order medicine in
a fake shop that would never arrive. Also, deceived buyers
can be affected by psychological problems because they
did fall for the scam. The attacker was not closer de-
fined. A recommended countermeasure with both groups
is only using known links. Experts again added using 2-
Attackers
Threat End Users Experts
Companies 9 (69%) 6 (75%)
State Actor 2 (15%) 6 (75%)
Criminals 10 (77%) 6 (75%)
Acquaintances 2 (15%) 3 (38%)
Intimate Partners 0 (0%) 1 (13%)
Bystanders 0 (0%) 1 (13%)
TABLE 3. NUMBER OF ATTACKERS MENTIONED BY END USERS
AND EXPERTS
Factor-Authentication. E5 suggested checking for the shop
analogously, e.g. in the commercial register of the state.
Damage:
- financial
- personal data
Shoulder Surfing
Vector:
- taking a look out of 
opportunity
Attacker:
- unknown individuals
Countermeasures:
- undefined
Figure 10. Shoulder Surfing
4.1.10. Shoulder Surfing. Shoulder surfing [fig. 10], the
act of taking a look at the screen of someone else, was
only mentioned by experts. As a consequence of people
taking the opportunity to take a look and use the observed
data later on were identified as financial consequences and
the loss of personal data. Attackers were described as
unknown persons that just happen to be near the victim.
Countermeasures were not defined.
Damage:
- personal data
Stalking
Vector:
- hacking camera
- access to data
Attacker:
- undefined
Countermeasures:
- tape the camera
Figure 11. Stalking
4.1.11. Stalking. Stalking [fig. 11] was mentioned by two
end users only. The intention of the attacker, who was not
described in detail, was identified loosely as physically
stalking someone or to search for certain personal data.
This could be achieved by hacking the camera of a
personal device and using access to data and could be
countered by taping the laptop webcam.
4.2. Attackers
In this section, we provide an overview of the attack-
ers that the participant imagined and elaborate on their
intentions. Table 3 gives an overview of the number of
mentions for each group. Participants often did not paint
a clear picture of possible attackers. Even after requesting
traits and details of an adversary for concrete threats, we
often only got vague statements or the clear declaration:
“I don’t know.”
A possible explanation for this is part of the discus-
sion section. We identified the following attacker models,
which include the attacking party, the intentions of this
party, the methods used, and the damage done by the
attacker. Still, we will not focus on the damage that these
attackers cause with their actions - this was part of the
previous section - but rather on the intentions.
4.2.1. Companies. End users and experts mentioned com-
panies as beneficiaries behind attacks. The most prominent
theme was generating profit out of end user data. This can
be done directly selling data about the companies cus-
tomers - U5 disclosed that they witnessed this first hand
when working in a company. Participants also mentioned
using data to improve advertising and by that generating
more profit. Some end users rated massive data collection
in order to make money as the right of the companies and
U3 even stated that one could read the terms in conditions
to be certain of those practices. In addition, both end users
and experts mentioned companies illegally obtaining data
from rival companies or targeting rivals with denial of
service attacks to harm them.
4.2.2. State Actor. Both experts and end users mentioned
state actors as attackers. While the possible intentions
of state actors for end users were limited to espionage,
experts could imagine additional reasons. Among them
are demonstration of power with denial of service attacks
or hacking big foreign companies to cause financial harm.
Noteworthy is the idea that state actors could target the
water supply of foreign states. Apart from a general
description of a state as an attacker, both official state
organs like intelligence agencies and covert groups that
would work under government guidance were mentioned
as possible actors. Participants also mentioned general
surveillance by state institutions as an intention and E3
stated:
For states, gathering data is less about specific
attacks and more like “Having more is better”.
They collect it in order to do Big Data stuff.
Both groups described state actors as powerful attackers
that are difficult to counter.
4.2.3. Criminals. Hackers and Criminals, be it individ-
uals or groups, have one thing in common. The act and
the intention is vicious from the beginning and involves
planning. We clearly state that every other attacker de-
scribed in this section also can have vicious intent and
use illegal and/or immoral methods. Intentions mentioned
were gaining financial profit or just harming the attacked
party. We also include developers of software in this
category who knowingly include malicious advertisements
to their product.
4.2.4. Acquaintances. Friends and family were only seen
as possible attackers by experts. Also, colleagues were
not mentioned as possible attackers by end users. Experts
identified attacks from friends, family, and colleagues as
less serious with intentions like playing a prank on the
victim or to make somebody’s day.
4.2.5. Intimate Partners. Only E5 casually mentioned
intimate partners as potential attackers. The intention was
identified as the demand to desire to know about the
conversations the partner is having.
4.2.6. Bystanders. Only E6 mentioned shoulder surfing
as a threat and identified bystanders as attackers. These
people would act out of opportunity or curiosity, there
was no initial malicious intent or planning. Thus, they are
not included in the criminals section.
4.3. Prevention and Defense Methods
Experts described prevention and defense methods in
more detail and more extensively than end users. In this
section we depict the most prominent countermeasures
that were mentioned.
Both groups recommended checking links before clicking
and ignoring or deleting suspicious emails. Experts’ top
advice was keeping systems updated and being mindful
of HTTPS. 2-Factor-Authentication was only mentioned
by experts for different threats. Backups were equally
prominent with experts and end users. Encrypting physical
devices was mentioned by half of the experts explicitly
and not by end users. While encrypted communication
was mentioned by both groups, HTTPS was only men-
tioned vaguely by U4:
Somehow there is this HTTPS at the beginning
of the bar. I think, if there is something missing...
i don’t know. If something is missing it is not the
genuine website. I think, if the S is missing at
the end. Then one should be suspicious.
Antivirus programs as a preventive method were
mentioned by all but one end user and only by one expert
who does not even use antivirus software. End users
promoted only visiting known and trusted websites more
prominently than experts.
5. Discussion
End user and expert perceptions vs. the technical
reality. Our findings on countermeasures and preventive
methods for the use of antivirus programs, updates,
trusted websites and being mindful of HTTPS are in line
with the findings of Ion et al. [5]: End users would
promote visiting trusted websites and using antivirus
software whereas experts advice to use updated software
and HTTPS connections.
Recent works on shoulder surfing suggest that close
acquaintances are also likely to be shoulder surfers
[1]. It is particularly noteworthy that the end users
that we interviewed for our study did not consider
friends, colleagues, or intimate partners as potential
attackers. We hypothesize that this is due to the following
reasons: In our study, end users were confronted with a
possibly intimidating topic in an intimidating interviewing
situation. We tried to make them feel as comfortable
as possible, but still, social desirability could have
affected the participants’ responses. For a study about IT-
security, attackers that would be educated in information
technology such as hackers might be obvious choices for
end users. Also, after several data scandals caused by
social media companies (e.g. Facebook and Cambridge
Analytica), that were covered by the main-stream media,
might add up to end users considering these companies
as possible attackers. In fact, companies and rudimentary
described criminals or hackers were the most common
attackers for end users.
Although ransomware has been quite present in recent
years and has been widely covered in the media (e.g.
WannaCry 2017), it was not mentioned by any end
user and only by 4 experts. U4 mentioned hospitals
being hacked and blackmailed but identified stolen
data as leverage. This could indicate a low technical
understanding of the characteristics of ransomware.
End users vs. experts. End users did not mention device
encryption explicitly as experts did. U4 mentioned using
a PIN code to secure the device when being stolen which
actually enables the encryption for the iPhone model of
the respective user. In the same context, U4 stated that
using the PIN would still not help in case an attacker
has access to a personal computer. This suggests that end
users have misconceptions about the security of PINs.
Experts were more consistent than end users when
reporting on their reasoning about potential threats. This
means every threat that was mentioned by the expert
group was mentioned by at least three experts.
Design challenges and future work. Based on our
findings, we hypothesize that end users are often not
motivated to perform a security measure as the associated
threat models and their impact on device security are
not clear to end users. Our results suggest that in some
cases, end users and experts perceive entirely different
attackers as likely. Based on the findings from this
study we argue, that our community should start to
incorporate prospective users in the design process to
tie security technology more to their needs; either (1) to
better understand which threats actually matter to them,
and (2) if these perceived threats do not correspond
with the technical reality, design security technology
that helps them to understand the actual benefits of
security technology and actually relevant threats. As
mental models are mostly informed by experience and
design, we argue that future work should focus on the
interplay of mental models and the design of security
technology. We therefore plan to explore user-centered
and value-centered design methods.
Limitations of our study. We recognize that our
convenience sample is all male and see the emerging
problems. Unfortunately, it is still hard to find female
experts in information security-related fields. We tried to
recruit experts with different backgrounds and recognize
that we should also have focused more on recruiting
female experts and practitioners. While we state that
valuable results have been found and we reached
saturation, a larger, more diverse sample of participants
for both groups could have resulted in additional findings.
Due to our inductive approach and the qualitative nature
of our study, our results have informed models and
theories about end user and expert mental models. Thus,
we cannot draw conclusions on quantitative aspects,
such as the prevalence of mental models in different
user groups. Hence our provided numbers can only be
interpreted as rough indicators that need further testing
with larger quantitative studies. We are aware of biases,
e.g. social desirability bias, that come with qualitative
research based on interviews with end users and which
we are not able to counter completely.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we presented a formative interview study
to explore mental models of threat models of both end
users and experts in a technology-agnostic and holistic
way. We found deep insights into the threat models for
both groups.
We discovered differences in attacker models and revealed
preventive methods and countermeasures used by end
users and experts. Experts would consider state actors as
attackers far more prominently than end users.
We found that end users would not consider close ac-
quaintances and intimate partners as potential attackers.
End users value trust-based countermeasures whereas ex-
perts overall promote more technical measures such as
using 2-Factor-Authentication. Future work could include
querying samples with participants from different regions.
We did not target participants who use smart home devices
and none of our participants mentioned threats related
specifically to these systems. Future work should explore
mental models of privacy and security of smart home
devices sampling participants using these devices.
In addition, such work could shed light on the fact that
acquaintances, friends, and especially intimate partners
are not present in end user mental models of potential
attackers.
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Appendix A.
Interview Guideline
A.1. Introduction
I would like to start the interview with questions on
your internet usage behaviour.
1) How much time do you spend in the inter-
net daily, including social media, news, surfing,
watching videos, working?
2) Which devices do you use?
A.2. Personal IT-Infrastructure Related
Now, I would like to ask you about threats towards
your infrastructure. Keep in mind that there are no wrong
answers.
1) What threats can you imagine for these devices?
2) Who do you think could have an interest in
attacking you?
3) What do you think are the attacker’s intentions?
4) How do you think they could do that?
5) What do you think could be the maximum dam-
age dealt?
6) How do you think you can defend yourself
against these attacks?
7) Which of these techniques are you using? If you
are not using a technique, why?
A.3. Interaction with 3rd-Party Infrastructure
Thank you for your answers so far. I would now like
to ask you about dangers regarding the communication
between you and a third party. Let’s say that you are
communicating with one of your devices with the provider
of an online service. This could be a online shop or a bank.
1) Can you think of threats when communicating
with the provider?
2) Who do you think could have an interest in an
attack?
3) What do you think are the attacker’s intentions?
4) How do you think they could do that?
5) What do you think could be the maximum dam-
age dealt?
6) How do you think you can defend yourself
against these attacks?
7) Which of these techniques are you using? If you
are not using a technique, why?
A.4. 3rd-Party-Infrastructure Related
Thank you. Now i would like to ask you about threats
directly towards the third party, like the provider of the
online service.
1) What threats can you think of that target the
provider directly?
2) Who do you think could have an interest in an
attack?
3) What do you think are the attacker’s intentions?
4) How do you think they could do that?
5) What do you think could be the maximum dam-
age dealt?
6) How do you think the provider can defend against
these attacks?
7) How do you think you can contribute to the safety
of the provider?
Appendix B.
Codebook - Primary Codes
• Affected Party: User, Provider, Others (e.g. ’com-
munication’)
• Affected Devices: Smartphone, Laptop, PC,
Tablet, Smart Home Device
• Phishing Mail
• XSS and Webattacks
• Malware
• Ransomware
• Imitation
• Shoulder Surfing
• Physical Theft
• Data Loss
• Identity Theft
• Stalking
• Denial of Service
• Damage
• Attacker
• Usability
• Attacker Intention
• Attack Method
• Countermeasure
• Security Assessment
Appendix C.
Consent Form
Research purpose: In this interview we look at
the understanding and perception of participants in IT
security terminology and attacker models.
Voluntarily: Your participation in this study is voluntary.
You can revoke your consent at any time and without
giving reasons. You can also cancel the interview at any
time without giving reasons, or request the deletion of
your data after completing the study.
Benefits and Compensation: There are no direct
benefits for you from participating in the study other
than participating in the lottery for a shopping voucher.
However, your experience contributes as a basis to a
better understanding of the perception of IT security
terminology and to make secure applications more usable.
Data protection: [institution redacted] considers data
protection issues as highly important. Our procedures in
this regard are in accordance with the relevant [country
redacted] data protection laws and regulations. Apart
from your age, gender (voluntary information) and
educational background, no personal data is collected.
The data collected during the survey is used exclusively
within the framework of the research project. The data
will not be passed on to third parties or used in any other
way.
With my signature I confirm that I have read this
declaration of consent and declare my voluntary
participation in this study. I have understood that I can
cancel the study at any time.
